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COMMENTARY
WEIGHTING PUNISHMENTS: A
COMMENTARY ON NEVARES-MUNIZ
ALEXIS M. DURHAM III*
In "The Eighth Amendment Revisited: A Model of Weighted
Punishments," Nevares-Muniz presents a model of punishment
designed to satisfy the proportionality and disparity requirements of
the eighth amendment.' This commentary focuses upon the nature
of the proposed model and suggests several difficulties with the
main arguments of the article.
The author begins by discussing the concept of "cruel and unusual punishment." She traces its roots from the English Bill of
Rights of 1689 through its original appearance in American judicial
opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont, 2 through the important case of Weems v.
United States,3 and to the recent cases of Coker v. Georgia4 and Rummel
v. Estelle.5 The discussion narrows to a treatment of the proportionality requirement associated with the currently conceived notion of
cruel and unusual punishment. The author points to the importance of the proportionality requirement by referring to the work of
Beccaria, 6 Hart 7, and the Criminal Code Revision Act of 1979.8
Nevares-Muniz then establishes the importance of the propor* Associate in Criminal Justice at the Center for Studies in Criminology and Law,
University of Florida. Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1984; M.A., 1980, B.A., 1977,
New College.
1 Nevares-Muniz, The Eighth Amendment Revisited: A Model of Weighted Punishments, 75J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 272 (1984).
2 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
3 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
4 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
5 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
6 C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (New York, 1963) (Ist ed. Milan,
1764).
7 Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 426 (1958).
8 Criminal Code Revision Act of 1979, S. 1723, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., §§ 3103, 3702
(1979).
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tionality requirement for the legitimate operationalization of the
standards regarding cruel and unusual punishment, and proceeds to
point out that "[t]he Supreme Court has mandated, moreover, that
the socially perceived severity of a crime be considered in assessing
the degree of offense seriousness for penal statutes." 9 The author
proposes the use of a scaling system such as the one devised by Sellin and Wolfgang' 0 to assure penal code compliance with eighth
amendment requirements. The remainder of the article briefly describes the scaling system of Sellin and Wolfgang and applies the
data of the 1978 National Survey of Crime Severity" to the Puerto
Rico Penal Code. The author concludes "that the eighth amendment's requirement of proportionality in sentencing is not satisfied
by the Puerto Rico Code's sentencing structure. In terms of perceived seriousness of harm to society, the statutory penalties do not
share a rational proportion with their corresponding offenses."1 2 To
remedy this situation, the author suggests use of a Sellin-Wolfgang13
type scaling system.
The author assumes that operationalization of the just deserts
model ought to entail use of citizen judgments to determine the just
penalty for law violation.' 4 She further suggests that her proposed
strategy conforms to the requirements of the model. This model
stipulates that offenders should receive punishment because of what
they deserve, not because of the incapacitative or rehabilitative
value of punishment. 15 Punishment should "fit" the crime and not
be tailored to the characteristics of the offender. Van den Haag and
others have argued, however, that justice is not necessarily what
public opinion thinks it is. Indeed, justice and the public view of
justice may have little in common.' 6 Nevares-Muniz does not
demonstrate how the use of public judgments facilitates the production of justice.
The second major problem involves the author's underlying assumptions concerning crime seriousness data. She writes that
In order to weigh the seriousness of offenses to determine appro9 Nevares-Muniz, supra note 1, at 277.
T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964).
11 See National Survey of Crime Severity: Final National Level Geometric Means and
Severiy Scores by Offense Stimuli Items (1978) (manuscript on file at the Center for
Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Pennsylvania).
12 Nevares-Muniz, supra note 1, at 285.
10 See

13 Id.
14 Id. at 280.
15 See A. VON HIRSCH, DOINGJUSTICE (1976).

16 See van den Haag, The CriminalLaw as a Threat System, 73J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
783 (1982).
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priate sanctions, courts need a system of reference against which to
evaluate the proportionality of the sanction relative to other crimes
and to the social harm inflicted by the crime along a single dimension.
Such a system of reference may be produced by crime severity

scales. 17
Nevares-Muniz also notes that "[tihe sanctioning rationale underlying our proposed crime-punishment model is retribution or 'just
deserts'; with its orientation toward the criminal acts themselves, it
is possible to assess them objectively.""'
Both of these remarks seem to reflect the author's belief that
crime seriousness data are objective data. This belief is of pivotal
importance and requires substantiation. Although numbers do
emerge from the attitudinal surveys conducted to assess public
judgments on the seriousness of crime, such judgments do not necessarily represent "objective" measures of the social harm associated with various forms of criminal activity. Even if citizens agree on
the seriousness of various forms of crime, and it is unclear whether
they do given the methods used in such surveys, 1 9 such agreement
may have little relationship to the actual social harm produced by
crime. Previous work has shown that public perceptions on a variety
of issues reflect serious misunderstanding. For instance, the results
of a 1978 public opinion survey revealed that more than half of
those surveyed believed that most recipients of welfare support
could manage without such assistance. Yet, two-thirds of welfare
recipients are children, the elderly, or the ill and disabled. 20 Of the
remaining recipients, only about 12%o do not work, and almost all of
these non-workers are females at home with small children. 2 1 An
example more closely related to punishment is Thomas and Howard's finding that public willingness to punish is related to mistaken
expectations regarding the ability of punishment to act as a
22
deterrent.
It seems especially inappropriate for Nevares-Muniz to argue
for the use of public judgments of crime seriousness given that objective assessments of actual harm are available. 23 Although there
17
18

Nevares-Muniz, supra note 1, at 277-78.
Id. at 285.

19 See Cullen, Link, Travis, & Wozniak, Consensus in Crime Seriousness: Empirical Reality
or Methodological Artifact?, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 99 (1985); Miethe, Public Consensus on Crime
Artifact?, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 515 (1982).
20 See I. ROBERTSON, SOCIOLOGY, at 272 (1981).
21 Id.
22 See Thomas & Howard, PublicAttitudes toward CapitalPunishment: 4 ComparativeAnalysis, 6J. BEHAV. ECON. 189 (1977).
23 See C. GRAY, THE COSTS OF CRIME (1979); R. Meiners, Public Compensation of tie
ictims of Crime: How Much Would It Cost? in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RET-
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are numerous difficulties with the measurement of actual harm, and
the measurement technology is in its infancy, the total neglect of the
approach on the basis of its current liabilities seems premature.
There are a number of costs of crime that will never lend themselves
easily to objective measurement, such as the effect of crime on the
moral fabric of society. Nevertheless, objective measures, such as
dollar amount of theft loss, for instance, might be combined with
subjective judgments. The use of subjective judgments could be
limited to the unmeasurable areas only. The resulting index might
provide a far more accurate estimate of actual harm than would be
possible solely through the use of subjective judgments.
Although crime seriousness data "look" like "objective" measures of crime seriousness, the numbers generated by the magnitude
estimation or Likert tasks that confront respondents merely represent the subjective judgments of respondents. Given that public
judgments are often mistaken, it can not be assumed that such judgments accurately represent actual harm. Judgments of the seriousness of white collar crime, for example, often have failed to
adequately represent the actual impact of such offenses upon society. Clearly, public opinion seldom has been trusted for a wide variety of technical policy questions. Can it be seriously proposed that
public opinion ought to be consulted to determine the proper prime
rate? The public may agree that the rate needs to be low enough to
stimulate investment to facilitate economic growth, yet it is left to
those skilled in economic matters to determine exactly what the rate
should be. Specification of penal policy may be a similar kind of
problem. Using public judgments to determine the penalty for burglary of a residence may be akin to use of such opinions to determine the prime rate, the percentage of hydrocarbons that is to be
tolerated in the atmosphere, or the rules for testing new drugs prior
to release into the open market.2 4 Matters relating to crime and
punishment may seem different than these other kinds of affairs simply because citizens tend to have opinions, often strongly held opinions, about crime. Few citizens become emotional about the prime
rate. However, the strength of convictions offers no assurance that
public views are reasonable.
RIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (R. Barnett & H. Hagel eds. 1977); Rottenberg, The
Social of Crime and Crime Prevention, in CRIME IN URBAN SOCIETY (McLennon ed. 1970);
Hann, Crime and the Cost of Crime: An EconomicApproach, 9J. CRIME & DELINQ. 12 (1972);
Rizzo, The Cost of Crime to Victims: An Empirical Analysis, 8 J. LEGAL STUDIES 177.
24 See Cullen, Link, & Polanzi, The Seriousness of Crime Revisited, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 83,
88-91 (1982). For instance, seriousness rank for spouse beating changed from 91 to 67,
bribery of a public official changed from 103 to 76, counterfeiting changed from 84 to
52, and marijuana use changed from 49 to 120.
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A third problem involves shifts in public judgments of crime
seriousness. It is apparent that public opinion does not remain constant regarding its evaluation of the seriousness of various kinds of
crime. For instance, a replication of a 1974 crime seriousness study
was conducted in 1979 and found that a variety of offenses were
perceived as substantially more or less serious than in the original
study. 25 Even assuming that public judgments were accurate reflections of actual harm, how might shifts in judgment be handled?
How often would surveys need to be conducted to assure constancy
26
in the relationship between law and public sentiment?
It is one enterprise to establish a scale of crime seriousness, it is
quite another to apply the scale to the development of a scale of
penal proportionalities. The author notes two approaches to this
task. The first approach is to develop an empirically-based method
for scaling penalties. The author correctly recognizes such a
method has not yet been devised. 27 Yet she fails to demonstrate
that this task is likely to be accomplished in the near future. The
second approach is to have a "sentencing authority" assign a punishment for one offense weight.28 Using the seriousness ratios, it
would then be possible to develop punishments for other offenses.
This second approach seems troubled by at least two weaknesses. The first involves the nature of the "sentencing authority."
Presumably, it must be an authority that recognizes justice when it
sees it. How can we be sure that the chosen authority will not prescribe unduly severe sentences? The author's argument attempts to
anticipate this problem by requiring the "least restrictive sanction
necessary to achieve defined social purposes .
-"29 However, this
fails to solve the problem because both what constitutes appropriate
social purposes, and what is the least restrictive sanction necessary
to achieve such purposes, is left unspecified by the author. Naturally, the same general difficulty exists at the opposite end of the
severity scale. The sentencing authority may select sentences of insufficient severity.
Like so many versions of the argument for punishments fitted
to the character of the crime, arguments put forward by such diverse
25 Of course, a response to these results is that citizens do determine these matters
through representatives they elect to public office. However, our discussion does not

concernjudgment of citizens regarding the selection of representatives to develop penal
policy. The issue involves the direct use of citizen judgments of seriousness itself as a

basis of penal policy.
26

Nevares-Muniz, supra note 1, at 288.

27
28

Id.

Id. at 276.

29C.

BECCARIA,

supra note 6, at 64.
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advocates as the eighteenth century utilitarian Beccaria and the
twentieth century retributivist von Hirsch, the crucial question of
exactly what should be the punishment for particular offenses is
swept aside. Beccaria writes:
If geometry were applicable to the infinite and obscure combinations of human actions, there ought to be a corresponding scale of
punishments, descending from the greatest to the least; if there were
an exact and universal scale of punishments and of crimes, we would
have a fairly reliable and common measure of the degrees of tyranny.
and liberty, of the fund of humanity or of malice, of the various nations. But it is enough for the wise legislator to mark the principle
points of division without disturbing the order,3 0not assigning to crimes
of the first grade the punishments of the last.

More than two hundred years later, von Hirsch, after failing to provide a principle that would make possible the derivation of specific
penalties, states:
Desert-based limits leave considerable choice as to the magnitude
of the scale. . . .It may be possible to delineate the limits on magnitude better than we have done, but the forgoing should suffice to illustrate the basic idea: in deciding the magnitude of the scale, deterrence
may be considered within whatever leeway remains after the outer
bounds set by commensurate deserts have been established. Once a
scale of a certain magnitude has been chosen, however, the internal
composition of the scale
should be determined by the principle of
3
commensurate deserts. '
In his use of the principle of commensurate deserts, von Hirsch
somehow derives a five year maximum sentence, but neglects to justify the choice or even describe its derivation.3 2 In keeping with this
tradition of outlining the general form of the system but declining
to specify exactly where actual sentences are to come from, NevaresMuniz explains that "[w]e do not suggest specific penalty ranges,
but emphasize that the constitutional requirement of parsimony
(i.e., the least restrictive sanction) must be acknowledged explicitly
in the statute. Furthermore, the offense's relative proportionality
should be followed." 33 The author further proposes that "the Legislature create a sentencing commission to construct a punishment severity scale." 3 4 Given the lack of a specific, operable method for
penalty scale construction, and the absence of any reason to believe
that without such a method a sentencing commission will possess
30 A. voN HIRSCH, supra note 15, at 93-94.
31 Id. at 136.
32

Nevares-Muniz, supra note 1, at 288-89.

33 Id. at 288.
34 See von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penalty Systems in America: An Overviw, 27
CRIME & DELINQ. 289 (1981).
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the capacity to develop a "just" system of punishments which satisfies the proportionality requirement, it is difficult not to react to this
proposal as simply another instance of the now aging rhetoric of the
justice model. Indeed, little has appeared in the decade since the
model began to acquire influence that provides optimism that the
model can be defensibly operationalized. The determinate sentencing systems which have emerged, such as that in Minnesota, represent less of a pure translation ofjustice model ideas and more of a
compromise between so-called practical exigencies and the requirements of justice. In Minnesota, out of deference to limited prison
space, sentences were determined in part on the basis of their anticipated effect on the state prison population.3 5 In a real fiscal world
the intrusion of such "practical" factors is perhaps unavoidable.
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the introduction of such influences dilute the final product such that what remains is a system
defended as just because its announced goal is justice, but which
comes no closer to its objective than penal predecessors built upon
notions of deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.
Finally, it is interesting that Nevares-Muniz appears willing to
use public judgments of the seriousness of crimes as the basis for
the operationalization of the justice model, but seems unwilling to
utilize public judgments to determine the appropriate predicates for
a system of punishment. Research suggests that the public supports
punishment on a number of grounds besides retribution. Thus,
punishment applied only to achieve justice, or controlled only byjustice- type considerations, appears to be inconsistent with public sentiment. Apparently, the value of public opinion extends only so far
as is required to set into motion the wheels of a penalty system legitimated on some other basis.
The major issues considered in this critique have serious implications for the future of the justice model as both an ethically acceptable and a practically workable basis for punishment. Some of
the problems identified appear to involve technical concerns that
may ultimately be solved through the development of more sophisticated techniques for the measurement of social harm. Other difficulties, however, such as the acceptance of public sentiment as an
operationalizing device and its simultaneous rejection as a legitimating predicate, may represent more serious challenges to the integrity of the model.
35

21 J.

See, e.g., Warr and Stafford, Public Goals of Punishment andSupportfor the Death Penalty,
& DELINQ. 95 (1984).
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